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VIRGINIA CHANGES ITS RULE REGARDING THE
REVIVAL OF A REVOKED WILL
If a testator in a valid instrument expressly revokes a prior will
and later revokes the revoking instrument, whether the deceased dies
testate under his first will or intestate will vary with the jurisdiction in
which the question arises. A number of states, following the common
law view, hold that the revocation of a revoking instrument revives
the earlier will as a matter of law. This holding is based upon the
view that the second will is ambulatory and does not become effective
until the death of the maker. Connecticut,' Illinois, 2 Louisiana, 3
Rhode Island,4 and South Carolina5 may be placed in this category.
2Va. Code Ann. § 2o-g(9) (Supp. 196o).
WVash. Rev. Code § 26.08.o2o (953).
Vis. Stat. § 247.07 (1959).
INVyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 20-47 (1957):
'WVhitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, 118 At. 454 (1922).
2Stetson v. Stetson, 200 Ill. 6oi, 66 N.E. 262 (1903).
'Succession of Dambly, 191 La. 5oo, 186 So. 7 (1938). The Civil Law State of
Louisiana reaches the common law result on the basis of its code provisions.
'Bates v. Hacking, 28 R.I. 523, 68 Ad. 622 (1907).
sKollock v. -Williams, 131 S.C- 352, 127 S.E. 444 (1925).
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A second view is that destruction by the testator nullifies the subse-
quent will, unless it is proved that the destruction took place with
an intent to die intestate. Florida,0 Maryland,7 and Pennsylvania 8
adhere to this rule. A third position is that the earlier will is not
revived unless republished. The theory of this view is that both wills
have been revoked by the testator and there is nothing to indicate
an intention to revert to the first will. Kentucky,9 Michigan,10 Texas,"
Wisconsin,' 2 and New York13 have taken this approach.14
Until 196o Virginia was generally considered to follow the rule that
the execution of a subsequent will with a revocation clause revoked
the prior will, and republication was necessary in order to revitalize
the prior will.' 5 However, the recent case of Timberlake v. State-
'Schaefer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1924).
,Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 157, 8 A.2d 922 (1939).
'In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 44 A.2d 670 (1945).
'Singleton v. Singleton, 269 Ky. 330, 107 S.W.2d 273 (1937).
I'Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich. 590, 114 N.W. 470 (19o8).
'Brackenridge v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S.W. 244 (1924).
'-In re Laege's Estate, 18o Wis. 32, 192 N.W. 373 (1923).
"In re Stickney's Will, 161 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E. 396 (1899); In re O'Donovan's Will,
168 Misc. 362, 6 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Surr. Ct. 1938); N.Y. Deced. Est. § 41.14Some jurisdictions hold that an earlier will is not revived unless the testator
manifiested an intent to revive the prior will when he revoked the subsequent will.
This is a variation of the third view which requires formal republication. In re
Johnson's Estate, 188 Cal. 336, 206 Pac. 628 (1922); Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N.E.
1oo4 ('9oo); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164, 102 N.E. 487 (1913); Lane v. Hill,
68 N.H. 275, 44 At. 393 (1895); In re Davis' Estate, 31 N.J.L. 161, 35 A.2d 88o
(Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
A small number of jurisdictions hold without presumption either way that
revival is solely a question of the intention of the testator. Blackett v. Ziegler, 153
Iowa 344, 133 N.W. 9oi (1911); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 (1903);
Ewell v. Rucker, 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S.W.2d 644 (1945); In re Gould's Will, 72
Vt. 3t6, 47 At. 1o82 (19oo).
"This is the rule that was adopted by the English Statute of Wills, 1 Vict. c. 26
(1837).
The common law view applied in courts of law in England was that a former
uncancelled will was not revoked by a subsequent will containg an express revocation
clause or an inconsistent disposition of the testator's property if the subsequent will
was revoked. The reason given was that since all wills are ambulatory until death,
the second will containing the revocation clause was revoked before it ever became
effective. Goodright v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 98 Eng. Rep. 317 (K.B. 1770). See also
Harwood v. Goodright, i Cowp. 87, 98 Eng. Rep. 981 (K.B. 1774)-
The Ecclesiastical courts refused to follow this automatic rule and revocation,
presumed or established, of a second will which implied or expressly revoked a
prior will raised no presumption as to the validity of the first will. Revival or non-
revival depend upon the intention of the deceased as determined from the cir-
cumstances of each case. Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add. 116, 162 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ad. &
Eccl. 1824).
The Wills Act of 1837 resolved this conflict by abolishing both of the existing
rules and substituting a new and different rule. The effect of sections 2o and 22
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Planters Bank'6 appears to have changed' this rule. In Timberlake
the testatrix made two wills, both of which were properly executed.
The second will contained a clause expressly, revoking any will or
codicil previously made. After the testatrix's death the second will
could not be found (although a carbon copy had been preserved by a
bank) and the first will was probated. The heirs appealed, contending
that the revocation clause of the subsequent will operated upon exe-
cution to revoke the testatrix's first will and the first will was never
thereafter revived or republished in accordance with section 64-6o17
of the Code of Virginia; therefore, the testatrix died intestate. In op-
position, the proponents of the first will relied upon the presumption
that a will which cannot be found and which was last in the custody
of the decedent was revoked before death.'8 Therefore, they con-
tended, the first will was never revoked because the second will was
presumed to have been revoked before death and never became effec-
tive. The court sustained the latter argument by ruling that the Code
of Virginia section 64-59,19 which specifies the procedures for revok-
ing a will, had not been complied with.29 Therefore the first will
of that act was to make the revocation of the first will by the second effective upon
execution, so that republication of the prior will was necessary if it was to be re-
vived. Sections 2o and 22 are substantially the same as sections 64-59 and 64-6o of
the present Code of Virginia. The leading case of Major v. Williams, 3 Curt. 432, 163
Eng. Rep. 781 (Adm. & Eccl. 1843) held that the revoking instrument does not
need to be in existence at the time of the death of the testator. Brown v. Brown,
8 El. and BL. 876, 120 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1858).
These particular sections of the Wills Act were adopted with6ut substantial
change in Virginia in the Code of Va. tit. 33 ch. 122 §§ 8, 9 (1849). Prior to that
time, the common law view of England was apparently effective in Virginia, although
there is no case in point. Bates v. Holman, 1o Va. (3 Hen. and M.) 5o2 (i8og). In
Rudisill's Ex'r v. Rhodes, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877) the testator executed three
wills with the second and third containing revoking clauses. The third will had
been revoked and the second uncancelled will was offered for probate. The court
held that revocation of the subsequent will did not revive the prior will under
the new sections of the Revised Code of 1849 and cited Major v. Williams, supra,
as authority. By dictum this rule was extended to a situation where a subsequent
inconsistent will would revoke a prior will if itself was unrevoked. Clark v. Hugo
130 Va. 99, 107 S.E. 730 (1921).
"82o Va. 95o, 115 S.E.2d 39 (96o).
"',No will or codicil... which shall be in any manner revoked shall, after being
revoked, be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil
executed in the manner herein before required, and then only to the extent to
which an intention to revive the same is shown." Va. Code Ann. § 64-6o (195o).
ifTate v. Wren, 185 Va. 773, 40 S.E.2d x88 (1946).
""No will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked, unless under the pre-
ceding section, or by a subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing... executed
in the manner in which a will is required to be executed, or by the testator ...
cutting, tearing... with the intent to revoke." Va. Code Ann. § 64-59 (195o)-
17Eimberlake v. State-Planters Bank, 2oi Va. 95o , 115 S.E.2d 39, 43 (1960) -
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was never revoked and no question of revival was involved. Stressing
the ambulatory nature of a will, the court in effect held that the
language of section 64-59 concerning the revocation of wills requires
that the written revocation be fully operative at the death of the
maker. The court also held that a revocation clause is an inseparable
part of the will and is operative only if the remainder of the will is
operative. The third and final basis for the decision was that the re-
sult reached would better carry out the intention of the testatrix.
The Code of Virginia of 1849 incorporated into the Virginia
Statute of Wills many of the provisions of the English Statute of Wills
of 1837.21 Two of the sections, which were adopted from the English
statute without substantial change, are the present sections 64-59 and
64-60.22 These code sections were first interpreted in 1877 in Rudisill's
Ex'r v. Rodes,23 which contained a factual situation identical with the
principal case. The court held that cancellation of a third will did not
revive the second will under the provisions of the Revised Code of
1849. This interpretation was in accordance with that placed on the
comparable English statutes.
24
The Rudisill case was distinguished in 1958 in. Poindexter v.
Jones25 wherein subsequent inconsistent wills were revoked by the
testatrix, and the prior wills were allowed to be probated. The court
refused to follow Rudisill on the ground that the subsequent wills in
Poindexter did not contain express revocation clauses. The further
and more substantial reason given for the decision was that the sub-
sequent wills were not operative at the death of the testatrix because
they were revoked. The court then concluded that there was never a
revocation of the first wills under section 64-59 of the Code of Virginia,
and therefore there was no issue concerning revival.
The court in the Timberlake case found its principal support in
Barksdale v. Barksdale26 wherein a second improperly executed will
contained an express revocation clause. In that case the court refused
to abstract the revocation clause to revoke the first will and ruled
that a revocation clause is effective only if the will of which it is a
part is effective. It is clear, however, that the Barksdale case can be
distinguished from Timberlake. In Barksdale there never was a re-
vocation, for the attempted second will was improperly executed.
2'Code of Va. tit. 33, ch. 122 (1849).
2See notes 17 and ig supra.
27o Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877).
24See note 15 supra.
-2oo Va 372, io6 S.E.2d 144 (1958).
"039 Va. (12 Leigh) 535 (1842).
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The court in the principal case also cited two recent Virginia
decisions supporting the application of Barksdale. The first was
Bell v. Timmins,-7 decided in 195o, which held .that the court would
not take an introductory revocation clause from a lost will to revoke
an earlier will offered for probate when the subsequent will itself
could not be proved. This case can be distinguished from the princi-
pal case, for in Bell the testator's last valid testamentary act was to
make a will affirming his desire to die testate. The existence of a sec-
ond will could not be proved to the satisfaction of the court. In the
principal case, however, the existence of the second will was estab-
lished. Thus the last act (presumed) of the testatrix was the revocation
of her last will, and this act is devoid of any intent to die either testate
or intestate. The second case cited was Poindexter v. Jones2s wherein
the testatrix executed two subsequent wills but later cancelled the sub-
sequent wills. Probate of two prior wills (which together disposed of
the entire estate of the testatrix) was allowed. This case can be dis-
tinguished on its facts, for the subsequent wills were merely inconsistent
in their disposition of the estate, so that the intent of the testator as
to his first will was equivocal, and it is arguable whether there was
sufficiently clear intent to operate as a revocation.2 9 The rationale
the court preferred in Poindexter, however, was in effect the appli-
cation of dependent relative revocation as announced in Barksdale.30
That is, the court concluded that the testatrix intended the first will
to be revoked only if the second will was effective at her death. The
application fails in Poindexter for the same reason that it fails in
Timberlake-because the last act of the testator was revocatory, rather
than affirmative of an intent to die testate.
The court indicated that the rule announced in the principal case
would carry out the intention of the testatrix better than would the
=19 o Va. 648, 58 S.E.2d 55 (1950).
'See note 25 supra.
nVhere there is a revoking clause, the intent of the testator is quite clear and
it is not necessary to look to the remainder of the will. An inconsistent, subsequent
will only revokes by implication, however, as it supplants the prior will only to the
extent that it makes inconsistent dispositions. It is logical, then, to require that
the inconsistent provisions actually become operative in order to accomplish a
revocation.
"Briefly stated, the rule of dependent relative revocation is: "If the testator
cancels or destroys a will.. -with the present intention of making a new one im-
mediately, and the new will is not made, or if made fails of effect because not proper-
ly executed ... then the old will, having been conditionally revoked, still stands.
[The law presumes] that he prefers his old will to intestacy; that the revocation
was conditioned upon the new testamentary disposition being effective." Bell v.
Timmins, i9o Va. 648, 659, 58 S.E. d 55, 61 (1950).
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former rule. It was argued that because the'revocation was testamen-
tary, it was more probable that the testatrix intended to revoke her
revocation rather than to die intestate. But the testatrix rejected prior
wills by execution of a subsequent will containing an express revoca-
tion clause, and then rejected the later testamentary disposition.
This would seem to indicate that neither of her two wills was satis-
factory to her. Furthermore, the present'rule seems to preclude any
testimony as to the intent of the testator at the time of revocation,
because once a valid revocation is established the revoking clause falls
and the prior will automatically springs up as the last will of the de-
ceased. 31
A final criticism of the principal case is that the rule is not con-
sonant with the statutes enacted in 1849 pertaining to revocation and
revival. While the section on revival did not distinguish between the
effect of a testamentary act and a separate act of revocation i.e., de-
struction of the will, a reading of the revocation and revival sections
together indicate that revocation was intended to be effective at the
time of execution of the clause.32 If the revocation is effective at the
time of execution, then the section dealing with revival is meaningful,
because the testator can later revive his revoked will. But if the re-
vocation clause is to take effect only at the testator's death, then the
revival section of the statute is meaningless, for the testator cannot
revive what was not revoked. Furthermore, at the time these statutes
were adopted they had been interpreted in England to mean that
revocation operated upon execution rather than at death.33
When viewed in the abstract, the rule of the Timberlake case is
as satisfactory as the rule it replaced; it is followed in other jurisdic-
tions. It is questionable, however, whether the rule as announced in
Timberlake is more desirable than the doctrine of Rudisill which
was overruled.
JOHN PAGE GARRETr
3 tTimberlake v. State-Planters Bank, 201 Va. 95o , 957-58, 115 S.E.2d 39, 44
(ig6o). It was generally held in the common law courts that the destruction of a
will containing a revocatory clause revived a former preserved uncancelled will, and
no proof to the contrary was allowed. Id. at 959, 115 S.E.2d at 45.
nSee notes 17 and ig supra.
mSee note 15 supra.
"The late English statute of wills ... has, we think, introduced some valuable
Improvements. ... [W]e have adopted nearly the whole of the statute, for double
reasons that we approve its provisions, and that the adoption here of those provisions
will give us the benefit of the English decisions upon them...." Report of the
Revisors of the Civil Code of Virginia, p. 623 (1849).
